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CONTROL OF THE SEX CRIMINAL
FREDERICK J. LUDWIG t
Of all aspects of this problem of sex offenses there is none that
can stir the observer more deeply than the age of the victims. The
records of the cases embraced in this study give the ages of 1,395
victims .... With a range from 2 to 68 years, the average age of
these 1,395 victims was 13 years, 8 months. Seventy-three of them
were under 6; 260 were between 6 and 10; 655 were between 10 and
16. Two of the victims were 2 years old; eight were 3, twenty-three
were 4, forty were 5, thirty-eight were 6, seventy-two were 7,
seventy-four were 8, and seventy-six were 9. The largest number of
victims of forcible rape fell in the 17-year-old group; of statutory
rape in the 15-year group; of attempted rape in the 10-year group;
of carnal abuse in the 8-year group; and of impairing morals in the
11-year group.
-Citiaens Committee on the Control of Crime,
Problem of Sex Offenses in New York City 9
(1939).
C OUPLED with this data, the same report covering the
period (1930-1939)1 indicated what happened to the of-
fenders. Of the 3,295 defendants convicted in New York
City, of those charged with any of the seven major sex
felonies (abduction, carnal abuse, incest, forcible rape, stat-
utory rape, seduction and sodomy), only one-third (1,140)
were convicted for the felony charged and this third was
restrained from five to twenty years, depending on the crime
and manner in which the judge exercised his discretion. The
remaining two-thirds (2,155) of those so charged were per-
mitted to plead guilty to misdemeanors. These could be re-
strained for no more than a year, by statute, although in
t Member of the Faculty, St. John's University School of Law.
' See Ploscowe, The Sexual Psychopath, Some Suggestions for Control,
PRIsoN WoRMI) 18, 19, 24, 25, 30 (July-August 1947).
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New York City, an indeterminate sentence of up to three
years is possible in these misdemeanor cases. The most
popular choice of "bargain pleas" for these indicted sex
felons was assault in the third degree (1,895, or 57 per cent).
Most of the remainder pleaded guilty to the crime of impair-
ing the morals of a minor. Similar data was uncovered in
other jurisdictions, and our daily press raised the hue and
cry that women and children were in omnipresent danger
from legions of "sex fiends" roaming the streets.2 An assort-
ment of psychiatrists, psychologists and sociologists jumped
into the fray and urged that legislative change-not mere
administrative improvement-was needed to provide ade-
quate social protection. It was their expert opinion that
nearly all sex crimes were committed by "psychopathic per-
sonalities"; that such psychopathic personalities will con-
tinue to commit sex crimes until they are "cured"; that they
can be identified even before they commit such crimes; that
they should not be punished because they have no control
over their impulses and are not really responsible for what
they do; and that their diagnosis, segregation, treatment and
release are the exclusive function of the psychiatrist. While
most of this criticism of existing statutes was directed at the
treatment of persons who commit sex crimes, a more recent
study of the sex habits of 5,300 males has been interpreted
as signifying that the lines of the criminal law have been
drawn too tightly around sex behavior; that literal enforce-
ment of penal sex statutes would have 5 per cent of the
population guarding the other 95 per cent in jails. This
agitation in the press, and the recent studies have now again
raised the question explicitly: does the penal law make
criminal sex behavior which it should not make criminal?
Implicitly the further question is also raised: Is there sex
behavior which ought to be made criminal which the penal
law does not make criminal as of this time?
2 See Gerber, Homosexuals, 65 Am. MERCURY 123 (June 1947) ; J. Edgar
Hoover, How Safe Is Your Daughter?, 144 Am. MAG. 32 (July 1947); Waldrop,
Murder as a Sex Practice, 66 Am. Mm cmy 144 (Feb. 1948); Whitman,
Biggest Taboo, 119 COLLIE'S 24 (Feb. 15, 1947); Wittels, What Cat We Do
About Sex Crimes?, 221 SAT. EvF POST 30 (Dec. 11, 1948); Horror Week,
34 NEwswEEK 19 (Nov. 28, 1949) ; A New Report on Sex Crimes, 22 CORONET
3 (Oct. 1947).
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The District of Columbia, and fourteen states, have
enacted "sexual psychopath" statutes in the past two decades.
Primarily, this legislation was concerned with treatment,
but it also created new kinds of criminality in sex behavior.
New York, which first resisted such a statute by guberna-
torial veto, has also recently amended its penal sex statutes
along these lines.3
The purpose of this article is to explore the respective
roles of criminal law and of psychiatry in controlling sex
behavior. What should be the goal of penal statutes in this
area? What means are best adapted and most likely to at-
tain the end selected?
I. THE PROBLEM IN TERMS OF MEANS AND ENDS
Proper evaluation of a body of law can best be realized
by considering it' as a means to an end. Accordingly, some
rational choice of an end or ends must be made for penal
sex legislation. This is necessary if sex control statutes and
their administration are to be consciously directed in a
uniform attack on the problem. Once this is done, the par-
ticular statutory provisions, considered as a means to this
end, may be selected or rejected according as they serve or
disserve the end. If the end is the prevention of undesirable
sex behavior, then the means, embracing the entire criminal
law machinery, must be appropriately adapted. This in-
cludes not only the statutes and the legislators who draft
them, but their administration and the personnel entrusted
with carrying out the statutes: the judges, prosecutors,
police, psychiatrists, psychologists and guidance counselors,
and the probation, parole and correction officers. Penal sex
statutes are a small but significant part of this machinery.
And the criminal law system is not the only, nor the best
means of serving this end. Moral and religious education,
wholesome home life and parental guidance, and a fair
chance to make a decent living, all are factors probably
better adapted to achieve it. Nor is the end of preventing
sex crimes the only one worthy of attainment. Being phrased
3 Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 525.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in somewhat negative terms, it may nonetheless be desirable,
not necessarily in and for itself, but only as a partial means
to more remote and valuable ends; e.g., a society dedicated
to the preservation of the family, the -institution of monog-
amous marriage, and the proper procreation of succeeding
generations. Consequently it is important that the means
selected to serve the end of preventing sex crimes do not in
and of themselves disserve other ends which are equally or
even more valuable in the long run.
Considered thus as a means, the function of the criminal
law in preventing sex crime is considerably restricted. It
may operate to attain this end only by the manner in which
it proposes to treat, and in operation does treat, persons who
actually commit sex crimes. The criminal law undertakes
their treatment for various purposes, any one of which may
serve the goal of prevention.
(1) It may concern itself primarily with the mass of
potential sex offenders and accordingly subject an actual
one to unpleasant treatment for the sake of deterring the
rest of them.
(2) It may ignore potential offenders and concern itself
only with the actual one. If so, it may undertake his treat-
ment, (a) by punishing him in the hope that through intim-
idation he will not behave again in such an undesirable
manner, or (b) by restraining him in an institution for so
much time as he is dangerous and likely to commit such
crimes, or (c) by attempting to rehabilitate him, if he is
corrigible. It will be pointed out (III, infra) that today's
controversy appears to center about which of these purposes,
deterrence of potential offenders or reform of actual ones,
should predominate. All parties substantially accept the
goal of prevention. Two basic questions must be answered
in order to determine the r6le of criminal law in controlling
harmful sex behavior: (1) What sort of socially undesirable
sex behavior should be made criminal, and (2) what kind of
treatment should be given to persons who commit such sex
crimes?
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II. CRIMINAL AND NON-CRIMINAL SEx BEHAVIOR
Basic Policy Considerations
The criteria for determining whether or not certain
socially undesirable sex behavior should be made criminal
ought not to vary greatly from those generally used to
delineate criminal from non-criminal behavior.
1. The behavior should be productive of serious social
evil;
2. It should be of a type possible to deter by the threat
of punishment;
3. It should be indicative that the persons who engage
in it are dangerous and more likely than the average person
to commit crimes;
4. It should be capable of unambiguous statutory
definition; and, finally,
5. The social attempt to prevent such behavior should
not be productive of more harm than good.
We shall examine the factors in that order:
1. Sex behavior productive of serious social evil.
Whether any certain sex behavior falls within this criterion
of criminality depends on the answer to two inquiries: (1)
What ends are served by this sexual behavior, and (2) are
these ends undesirable? The first question is obviously one
of fact and the second question is one of social values and
moral standards. Clearly sex behavior which serves desir-
able ends, such as the preservation of the family, the en-
couragement of the institution of monogamous marriage,
and the proper procreation of the succeeding generations,
should not be made criminal. There remains the question
whether all sex behavior which does not subserve these valu-
able ends ought to be subject to penal treatment. Phrased in
another way: Should all immoral sex behavior be made
criminal? An emphatic negative has come from interpreters
of the Kinsey-Pomeroy-Martin report. "85% of the younger
male population could be convicted as sex offenders if law
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
enforcement officials were as efficient as most people expect
them to be." 4
Accordingly, it has been urged that criminal legislation
in the sex field must only aim at expressing "the judgment
of the average conscience as to the minimum standard of
Right." r It is argued in support of this view that criminal
law depends for its enforcement upon the "average men"
who serve as complainants, witnesses and jurors. The argu-
ment continues that when criminal statutes postulate moral
standards higher than those of the community, sympathy for
the accused will cause the statutes to be nullified, or enforced
only occasionally and indifferently. This line of argument
has a core of truth in that excessive severity impairs the pre-
ventive efficacy of a criminal statute, because increasing the
severity of punishment seriously diminishes the certainty of
its infliction.
But the danger of nullification in the field of sex crime
has been over-emphasized. First, it is usually the application
of unduly severe punishment for criminal behavior rather
than the making of certain kinds of behavior criminal that
leads to non-enforcement of penal statutes. Second, the
selective enforcement of penal statutes dealing with sex and
other conduct makes improbable their nullification when
they seek to uphold standards far above average community
behavior. 6 Third, even assuming arguendo the validity of
studies reporting -widespread sex behavior which is defined
as criminal under existing statutes, no valid case is thereby
made for the statutes' repeal. Individuals who report way-
ward sex conduct to interviewers do not thereby declare
their preferences for such behavior in others. 7 Indeed, far
from condoning such behavior in others, such deviates might
well be more severely critical than those whose sex behavior
accords with official standards. Consequently, there appears
to be no great probability of nullification of existing sex
statutes from this source. Finally, even if there were, no
4KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 224 (1948).
5 KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 26 (13th ed. 1929).6 See Horack, Sex Offeiues and Scientific Investigation, 44 ILL. L. REV. 149,
152-3 (1949).
7 See Sorensen, Book Review, 29 NEB. L. REv. 156 (1950).
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positive peril has been shown to result from the fact of
nullification of penal sex statutes as can be seen in the case
of adultery.
Moreover, and of crucial importance, the criminal law
system should not abdicate its function as an instrument of
moral education. In addition to subjecting actual offenders
to compulsory treatment, the criminal law also has the func-
tion of indicating to the greater mass of potential offenders
what is right and wrong in sex behavior.s Penal statutes
are an important determinant of a state's public policy which
in turn often provides the framework of reasoning for judi-
cial controversies which arise in areas outside of the criminal
law. Repeal or amendment of penal statutes simply because
of their disregard by some portion of the population might
well be construed as a fundamental alteration of the state's
public policy.
In short, while the law must consider the mores of the
community in defining the criminal, there is no requirement
that the law adopt as its standard of legality the standards
of the strayed. Yet it is clear that not all immoral sex con-
duct should be made criminal. Trivial offenses that burden
the administrative machinery and offenses that foreshadow
harm only to the actor himself, are not serious enough to
justify official intervention. Such behavior, if it is to be
controlled at all, must be regulated by the home, church and
school, and by similar non-criminal agencies."
2. Sem behavior possible to deter. One of the crucial
issues between positivists and classical criminologists turns
about the question of which of the many ends of treatment
of sex criminals should predominate. Positivists who urge
the sexual psychopath type of statute insist the proper end
is that of the restraint of dangerous persons and their re-
8 See BECCARIA, CRIMES AND PUNISHMSNTS, C. Xxiii.
9 Answering the question whether human law should repress all vice,
St. Thomas Aquinas points out: "Now human law is framed for a number
of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore
human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only
the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain;
and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of
which human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder,
theft and suchlike." DE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Ia, Ilae, Q. 96, Art. 2.
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habilitation, if they are corrigible. Many of them insist that
most sex crimes are the product of irresistible impulse on the
part of psychopathic personalities. The so-called classicists,
on the other hand, advocate punitive treatment to intimidate
actual offenders and deter potential ones. They dispute the
contentions of the positivists, and urge that sex crimes are
committed by deterrable but not always undeterred offenders.
Since both groups agree that compulsory treatment should
be given sex criminals whether or not it is possible to deter
them by threat of punishment, resolution of the issue affects
only the kind of treatment and not the determination of the
criminality of the sex behavior. Accordingly, this matter
will be discussed under III, infra.
3. Sex behavior indicative of a dangerous person. There
is only one type of sex offense which indicates that the actor
is probably more likely than the average person to engage
in it again in the future and which does not fall either within
the first category (sex behavior socially undesirable) or
second category (sex behavior possible to deter). This type
of sex offense is the seriously undesirable sex behavior of a
person suffering from a well-defined mental disorder which
renders him legally insane and criminally irresponsible for
his acts. That such persons, although not deterrable by the
threat of punishment, should be incapacitated for so long as
they are dangerous, is a conclusion which is not disputed.
The only issue is whether the selection of persons for com-
pulsory treatment should be made upon the basis of their
potentiality for harmful behavior rather than upon the
demonstrated harmfulness of their actual behavior. The
former method of defining criminality has been employed
abroad.10 It is also employed in many of our sexual psycho-
path statutes. Certainly its widespread adoption in our
criminal law administration would raise grave political ques-
tions in a society dedicated to the principles of individual
freedom.
10 See THE PENAL CODE OF THE RUSSA N SOCIALIST FEDERAL SovIET RE_-
PuBLic, Art. 16 (H. M. Stationery Office, 1934).
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4. Capability of unambiguous statutory definition.
Closely related to the ideal of protection of the individual's
civil liberty is the principle of Anglo-American criminal jus-
tice that there can be no punishment for behavior unless it
is prohibited by pre-existing law (nulla poena sine lege).
This principle is in sharp contrast to the totalitarian doc-
trine that there can be no wrong committed against the state
which is incapable of being punished (nullum crimen sine
poena)."1 Under our system of law, accordingly, the crim-
inal "law" must be declared in advance either by the legis-
lature in the form of statutory crimes, or by the courts in the
form of common law crimes, the statutory crimes, of course,
always being subject to judicial interpretation. New York 12
and fourteen other states have only statutory crimes.' 3 In-
deed, where statutory crimes are involved, the use of am-
biguous language in and of itself raises the question of denial
of due process of law. While all language has some inherent
ambiguity, the rationale of this requirement is that advance
notice be given "so far as possible," and has been stated in
the following terms by Mr. Justice Holmes:
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider
the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that
a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the
common world will understand, of what the law intends to do after
a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as pos-
sible the line should be clear.14
5. Attempted prevention as causing more harm than
good. Assuming that a certain course of sex conduct is so-
cially undesirable, that it is possible to deter, that it is in-
dicative that the person engaging in it is dangerous, and that
31 See, e.g., Comment of German Minister of Justice on Nazi Criminal Code
of September 1, 1935: "We have substituted for the outworn maxim mudla
poena shne lege the more efficacious doctrine indhin crimen sine poena, regard-
less whether or not some specific existing law has been broken." The Soviet
Criminal Code (Jan. 1, 1927) provided: "Every act or failure to act is a
social danger if it is directed against the Soviet regime or when it injures
the order established by the Workers' and Peasants' authority."
22 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 22; People v. Ingber, 248 N. Y. 302, 162 N. E. 87
(1928).
23 Cal., Ill. (at least for felonies), Ind., Iowa, Kan., La., Mich., Mont.,
Neb., Ohio, Okla., Ore., S. D. and Tex.
14 McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931).
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it is capable of unambiguous statutory definition, it may still
be imprudent to make such conduct criminal if by so doing
the harmful consequences of making it criminal counter-
balance the desirable ones. For instance, making such be-
havior criminal might serve the desirable end of preventing
sex crimes, but at the same time disserve other ends of equal
or greater value. Such counterbalancing ends might be dis-
served in the undue infringement of individual privacy or in
the tendency toward the corruption of public officials charged
with enforcement. Our recent experiment with Prohibition
is warning in itself that in attempting to prevent one evil,
many others far more serious may be created.
III. TREATMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS
Some fourteen states and the District of Columbia now
have sexual psychopath statutes of one type or another on
their books. These statutes vary considerably in procedure
and in the elements of their definitions of the condition to
be treated. Some of the statutes make criminal behavior
which theretofore was not criminal, e.g., an habitual course
of sex misconduct. All of the statutes prescribe new types
of treatment, usually left to the discretion of an administra-
tor, which treatment departs from the traditional legislative
definitions of imprisonment in terms of minima and maxima.
The administrators in a number of these jurisdictions report
in the following terms concerning the enforcement of these
statutes.
California (1939) 15 "Leaves much to be desired; an in-
effectual law."
District of Columbia Fourteen cases in 1949. "A Star
(1949) Chamber procedure, with inade-
quate diagnostic and treatment
facilities."
Illinois (1938) Sixteen cases in ten years. "1... re-
quires change; little interest in
administering present statute."
15 The date after each of the states is the year in which the statute was
enacted.
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Indiana (1949)
Massachusetts (1947)
Michigan (1939)
Minnesota (1939)
New Hampshire (1949)
New Jersey (1949)
New York (1950)
Washington (1947)
Vermont (1943)
One case. "Undesirable in prin-
ciple, ineffective in operation: no
solution to the problem."
Inoperative. "1... hurriedly enacted,
not completely satisfactory; courts
do not like it."
Law inoperative.
Under 200 cases in ten years.
no triumph for justice or for the
protection of society."
No commitments. "These cases
should not be sent to a state hospi-
tal. No treatment facilities."
Thirty-five cases in six months. "A
temporary measure, inadequate to
handle problem."
Fourteen cases in nine months. No
releases.
Inoperative.
Virtually inoperative.
No data is available from the following states with such
statutes: Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania.10
The most recent of these statutes is that of New York,
and because of its importance we shall examine it in some
detail. This recent New York statute does not make crim-
inal any sex or related behavior not theretofore defined as
criminal. Thus, it does not create any new criminal status
such as "sexual psychopath." The changes effected in New
York are purely ones of treatment.
16 Psychiatrically Deviated Sex Offenders 4-9 (Feb. 1950), published by
the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, 3617 W. 6th Ave., Topeka,
Kansas.
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(1) Psychiatric examination of offenders convicted of
certain sex crimes is now mandatory before sentence. 17 Prior
to this change in the law, such examination was discretionary
with the sentencing judge, but it usually was ordered.
(2) When the defendant is convicted of certain specified
sex crimes, an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment in a
state prison is prescribed, within the discretion of the sen-
tencing judge, ranging from a minimum of one day to a
maximum of the defendant's natural life. The sentencing
judge now has the choice of suspending sentence or placing
the defendant on probation or imposing the traditional sen-
tence prescribed for the crime, as he formerly might have
done, or of imposing the new indeterminate sentence.""
(3) Certain changes are effected in the parole of defen-
dants receiving the new indeterminate sentence.'9 They
enjoy certain advantages over prisoners receiving the tradi-
tional straight-term sentences:
(a) Prisoners sentenced in the traditional way are
eligible for parole only upon the completion of the minimum
of their sentence, which might, under the old law, be inde-
terminate in a more limited sense. Those prisoners, however,
who receive the new indeterminate sentence are mandatorily
eligible for parole within six months after their conviction
and at least once every two years thereafter.2"
(b) If a prisoner sentenced in the traditional way is re-
leased on parole and commits a felony while on parole, he is
compelled, in addition to any new sentence imposed for the
second crime, to serve the remainder of the original maxi-
mum sentence. Those persons receiving the new indeter-
minate sentence and released on parole are exempt from this
requirement.2'
17 N. Y. PENAL LAw § 2189-a. Added by Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 525, § 23.
Is Id. § 2188. Added by Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 525, § 22.
19 N. Y. CoaRa LAw § 212.
20 Id. § 214, subd. 3. Added by Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 525, § 6.
2- Id. § 219.
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(c) A prisoner sentenced in the traditional way may
not be discharged from parole until the expiration of the full
maximum term of his fixed sentence, unless he is an honor-
ably discharged war veteran. 22 Those receiving the new in-
determinate sentence, however, may be either conditionally
or absolutely discharged prior to such expiration, 23 a neces-
sary provision in view of the extensive nature of the maxi-
mum.
The single disadvantage in a parole sense of the new
indeterminate term prisoner is his lack of eligibility for
reduction of his minimum term, as is given to traditionally
sentenced prisoners, by the amount of ten days off out of
each month for good conduct.
An additional treatment advantage, however, for those
receiving the new indeterminate sentences is that they are
not considered "sentenced to life imprisonment" in such a
way as would result in their being declared civilly dead,24
or as to prevent their maintaining civil actions, as long as
the actions are not connected with the arrest.25
The new treatment in New York is available only upon
conviction of any one or more of the following specified eight
types of sex or sex-based crimes:
New York
Penal Law Criminal Behavior Alternate Maximum Punishment
§ 243 Assault in the second de- 5 years imprisonment
gree if committed with the and/or $1,000 flue
intent to commit rape in
the first or second degree,
sodomy in the first or
second degree or carnal
abuse.
§ 483-a Carnal abuse of a child 10 years imprisonment
ten years or under by a de-
fendant eighteen or older.,
22 d. § 220, subd. 2. Added by Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 525, § 8.
23 Id. § 230, subd. 2. Added by Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 525, § 9.
24N. Y. PA LAs.v § 511. Added by Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 525, § 14.251d. § 510. Added by Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 525, § 13.
1951 ]
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New York
Penal Law
§ 483-b
Criminal Behavior
Carnal abuse of a child
over ten and under six-
teen by a defendant pre-
viously convicted of rape
in the first or second de-
gree, abduction, sodomy,
incest, endangering the
morals of a child or the
carnal abuse of a child (§
483-a, supra), attempt to
commit any of these
crimes, or an assault in
the second degree with an
intent to commit any of
them.
§ 690 Sodomy in the first de-
gree.
§ 2010 Rape in the first degree.
§ 1944-a Sexual abuse while com-
mitting a felony. Carnal
abuse or indecent or im-
moral practice with the
sexual organs of a child of
sixteen or under.
§ 1940 The conviction of any f~l-
ony where the defendant
has a prior conviction
anywhere of the crimes of
rape in the first or second
degree, carnal abuse, sod-
omy in the first degree,
assault in the second de-
gree with intent to com-
mit any of the above
crimes, or an attempt to
commit any of the above
crimes.
Alternate Maximum Punishment
10 years imprisonment
20 years imprisonment
20 years imprisonment
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In the nine months since its adoption in 1950, 14 sex
offenders have been given this indeterminate treatment in
the discretion of trial judges. Of these, two have since ap-
peared before the parole commission, and have been denied
release. In addition, for the first two months of 1951, while
official figures are not readily available, it is estimated that
an additional 14 sentences have been rendered.26  This iiidi-
cates a far more enthusiastic reception of the sexual psycho-
path program in New York than has been reported elsewhere.
But regarding the New York and related statutes as
threshold legislation, in anticipation of that day when such
treatment shall be mandatory for all sex offenders-and
possibly for all persons convicted of crime-its proponents
rely upon three basic propositions:
(1) Persons who commit sex crimes belong to a more or
less well-defined group, distinguishable from the generality
of criminals by the peculiar nature of their mental disorder.
They are not mere criminals but "psychopaths", "psycho-
pathic personalities", "psychiatrically deviated" persons,
"constitutional psychopathic inferiors" or, in the less stilted
nomenclature of our public press, "perverts and degen-
erates."
(2) The existing rules concerning the legal respon-
sibility of mentally disordered persons are inadequate to
meet the treatment needs of the sex offender. These rules
are claimed to be too stringent, and based upon a defective
and unreal psychology. Under them, the proponents of the
new legislation point out, sex offenders constitute a tertium
quid, neither irresponsibly insane nor fully responsible.
(3) Whether or not sex offenders do belong to a special
class, the proponents continue to argue, there is no reason
why all criminal offenders should not receive completely in-
determinate sentences. Social protection against dangerous
persons, it is argued, and the reformation of corrigible crim-
inals, make the old-fashioned term sentence obsolete, and the
indeterminate sentence the proper form of criminal treat-
ment. We shall examine the arguments in that order.
2G6 Information obtained from the New York State Parole Commission and
Department of Correction, March, 1951.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
1. Sew Offenders as a Special Class
Special treatment for sex offenders is based upon the
assumption that sex offenders constitute a well-defined group
who are more likely than the generality of criminals to re-
peat their crimes, regardless of the punishment which is
imposed. No doubt some cases of habitual sex offenders
exist. The important inquiry in connection with this argu-
ment, however, is whether the rate of recidivism for sex
offenders is higher than that for criminals generally. Avail-
able evidence indicates that such may well not be the case.
The most intensive and recent study was that of 102
offenders in Sing Sing who were either in prison for convic-
tion of sex crimes, or else were in prison for the commission
of non-sex crimes but had prior sex crimes in their records.
The findings can be summarized as follows: 27
PREVIOUSLY ARRESTED
Reason in Prison Total Sex Offenses Other Offenses
Convicted of Sex
Offense 87 27 53
Convicted of
other offense 15 5 11
Grand Total 102 32 64
Thus twice as many of the inmates who were in Sing
Sing because of conviction for a sex crime had been pre-
viously arrested for non-sex crimes as had been arrested for
sex crimes. A full third of those who were in prison, on the
other hand, because of conviction for non-sex crimes had
previously been arrested for sex offenses. This hardly bears
out the contention of the proponents of the new legislation
that sex offenders are a specialized and well-defined group.
Moreover, a further analysis of the 87 convicted sex offenders
in terms of the number of their previous arrests rather than
in terms of figures based on the individuals, indicates an
27REPORT ON STUDY OF 102 SEx OFFENDERS AT SING SING PRISON 66-95
(1950).
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even wider disparity. All told, the 87 individuals committed
for sex crimes had a total of 54 prior arrests for sex crimes
and 140 for other crimes.
The most extensive study ever made of sex offenders,
covering a decade in New York City, shows that of 555 con-
victed sex offenders in 1930, for example, only 31--or slightly
more than 5 per cent-were convicted again of sex crimes
within the next dozen years. Of this small percentage who
were re-convicted, only 6 of the 31 were convicted more than
once, chiefly for indecent exposure, a non-violent form of
sexual mal-behavior.28
In the same city, another recent study limited to juvenile
offenders shows that of 108 boys accused of delinquency aris-
ing out of sex offenses, only three of them were charged with
delinquency again, and none of these three re-delinquencies
involved sex offenses. On the other hand, of 148 boys charged
with general types of delinquency, of a non-sexual character,
109 of them turned out to be subsequent offenders. 29
That these findings are not confined to New York is in-
dicated by national data on recidivism. Of the twenty-five
types of crimes committed by males, the rank of each is
indicated each year by the Uniform Crime Reports according
to the proportion in each of offenders who have prior crim-
inal records. To select a typical pre-war year, for example,
in 1937 drug addicts ranked first in terms of recidivism, but
rapists were nineteenth and other sex offenders, seven-
teenth.30
As criminals, sex offenders are in no sense specialists
such as safe crackers or pickpbckets. Nevertheless, it is
urged that sex criminals are distinguishable from the gen-
erality of criminals on the basis of the peculiarity of their
mental disorder. To understand this, it will be necessary to
examine briefly the field of mental disorder. Such disorders
have been classified in the following terms, in order of de-
creasing seriousness:
28 REPOXRT OF MIAYOR'S COMMITEE FOR THE STUDY OF SEX OFFENSES, NEW
YORK CITY 92-95 (1939).29 DOSHAY, L. J., THE Boy SEx OFFENDER, C. 9-12 (1943).3 0 Sunderland, Sexual Psycopath Laws, 40 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
543, 547 (Jan.-Feb. 1950).
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(1) Psychosis; (2) psychoneurosis; 31 (3) psychopathic
personality; 32 (4) anxiety state; and (5) mental defec-
tiveness. 3 4  There is relatively less disagreement among the
various schools of psychiatry with respect to the definition
of psychosis than there is with reference to psychoneurosis,
psychopathic personality or anxiety state. The term psy-
chosis represents the most deep-seated mental disorder,
which constitutes a devastating disorganization of the entire
personality. Normal adjustment to social environment is
impossible for the psychotic person. A number of types of
psychosis have been recognized by the generality of psychi-
atrists: schizophrenia,35  manic, depressive psychosis,36
paranoia, 37  general paresis,38  senile dementia,3 9 alcoholic
psychosis, 40 epilepsy 4: and, less commonly, traumatic, ar-
31 Characterized by emotional conflict and maladjustment. Unlike psychosis,
there is no organic causation, no reality distortion, no impairment of intellect
and no pathological moodiness.
32 Principal characteristics associated with this questionable category are
frequent emotional instability, poor ethical perspective and general judgment.
Intellect may nevertheless be unimpaired, e.g., drug addicts, chronic alcoholics.
3 A stage of unusual and prolonged tension characterized by fear without
reason which precedes panic. Soldiers under fire and civilians in bombed areas
provide numerous cases.
34 Usually persons of retarded mental development, especially intellect, e.g.,
idiots, imbeciles, morons.
A form of mental disorganization usually appearing during adolescence
(hence, also called dementia praecox) characterized by introverted, shut-in,
seclusive, impulsive and negativistic behavior. Emotions are blunted, judgment
defective and volition definitely injured. Illusions, hallucinations and delusions
are common. Catatonic, paranoidal, hebephrenic (most common) are some of
the recognized forms of this disorder.
36 A psychosis where the patient experiences successive periods of unusual
excitement and elation with flight of ideas, morbid feelings of happiness, im-
pulsive reactions and unusual mental activity (mania) alternating with de-
pressive stages where he is sad and retarded mentally. In between there is
usually a normal period (lucid interval).
37 Mental disorder characterized by an orderly arrangement of chronic de-
lusions, often ones of persecution. The patient is vain, suspicious and fearful.
Usually there is little mental deterioration no matter how long the condition
has persisted.
38 An organic disease of the brain resulting from advanced syphilitic in-
fection. In advanced stages there are alternate periods of euphoria and de-
-pression, delusions of greatness and general deterioration of memory, perception
and orientation.
39 A condition resulting from deterioration of brain tissue which sometimes
occurs with advanced age. Memory, perception and judgment are impaired.
40 A mental disorder resulting from excessive use of alcohol. Three rec-
ognized forms are delirimn tremens, chronic alcoholism and Korsakow's
psychosis.
4' A disorder characterized by loss of consciousness and involuntary move-
ments. It may be traumatic resulting from scar tissue near the brain or idio-
pathic when it arises spontaneously without apparent cause.
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terioselerotic, toxic and involutional psychoses.
The question is: Are sex offenders more frequently
afflicted with such profound mental disorders than are other
criminals? The New York State study of sex offenders in
Sing Sing found all of them suffering from some sort of
"mental or emotional disorder, though not usually so pro-
nounced [as psychosis]. . . . In many cases the behavior
patterns could not be fitted into any clear-cut psychiatric
classifications. ... there is no known mental disorder that
presupposes the commission of sex crimes." 42
Ten years before this study of the 2,022 sex offenders
examined in the decade-long survey in New York City, 246
likely cases, including persons who committed the crimes of
carnal abuse, sodomy, indecent exposure and impairing
morals, were specially selected for mental examination. Of
these 246 persons, 160 were found neither insane nor men-
tally defective, 35 were adjudged insane and 51 were ad-
judged mentally defective. 43  These are by no means stagger-
ing ratios of mental disorder. It is also significant that the
data concerns only a ratio-that is, of psychotic sex offenders
compared with all sex offenders, and not a proportion, or the
ratio of psychotic sex offenders to all sex offenders as com-
pared with the ratio of psychotic criminals to all criminals.
Indeed the group for Advancement of Psychiatry recently
concluded "that only a small proportion of males convicted
of sex offenses have been involved in behavior which is ma-
terially different than that of most males in the population.
This small group, which numbers in the neighborhood of 5
to 10 per cent, is that which engages our attention as psy-
chiatrists." 44
With respect to the significance of non-psychotic mental
disorder in sex crime, there is wide variation in points of
view among psychiatrists. At the psychiatric clinic of the
Court of General Sessions in New York County, only 15.8
per cent of the sex felons examined were found to be psycho-
pathic personalities. At Bellevue Hospital, psychiatrists
4 2 REPoRT ON STUDy 01F 102 SEx OmNnaas IlN SING SING 13 (1950).
43 PROBLEM OF SEX OraNsas IN NEW YoRE Crry 10 (1939).
44Psychiatrically Deviated Sex Offenders 1 (Feb. 1950), published by the
Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, 3617 W. 6th Ave., Topeka, Kansas.
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found 52.9 per cent of the sex felons to be psychopathic
personalities. 45 From the psychiatric viewpoint sexual be-
havior is either normal or abnormal. Much that is con-
sidered normal, in a psychiatric sense, such as non-violent,
hetero-sexual behavior, may nonetheless be considered im-
moral, as adultery or statutory rape. On the other hand,
much sexual behavior which is considered abnormal in a
psychiatric sense may not be criminal at all. For instance,
this is true in the case of masochism 46 and onanism 17 and
often in the case of sadism, 48 fetishism 49 and voyeurism.50
Probably most sex behavior which is abnormal when viewed
in psychiatric perspective is also criminal, such as necro-
philia,5 1 bestiality,52 paedophilia 53 and homosexuality. But
this is not always so. "Homosexuality is often found in per-
sons who show no other marked mental or physical ab-
normality." 54 A more or less well-defined relationship
between non-psychotic mental disorder on the one hand and
abnormal sex behavior on the other, has not yet been de-
veloped on the basis of the existing state of psychiatric
knowledge. The psychiatrist who directed the New York
State study of sex offenders in Sing Sing has admitted else-
where that "there is no real psychiatric insight into crim-
inalistic behavior." 51 Under all of these circumstances, it
is difficult to see how it can be argued that non-psychotic
mental disorders have more significance in the case of sex
offenders than do the full-scale psychotic ones; or how it can
be argued that either the psychotic or non-psychotic forms
of mental disorder is more frequently associated with sex
crimes than with crimes in general.
45 Frosch and Bromberg, Sex Offender-A Psychiatric Study, 9 Am. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 761 (Oct. 1939).
46A feeling of need for punishment and suffering of pain which may result
in sexual gratification. Suicide is an extreme form.
4 Self-abuse.
4s The reverse of masochism in which aggression and pain is directed at
others for the actor's gratification.
49 Worship of some object as a substitute for some original object or ex-
perience, such as a shoe or a lock of hair.50 Looking or peeping at sexual objects.
51 Desire for copulation with a dead human body.52 Desire for copulation with animals.
53 Desire for copulation with children.
54East, Sexual Offenders-A British View, 55 YALE L. J. 527, 545 (1946).
55 ABRAHAMSEN, CRIME AND THVE HUMAN MrND 26 (1944).
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2. Legal Responsibility of Sex Criminals
In 1843, an assassin intent on taking the life of the
Prime Minister, Lord Peel, succeeded only in killing Lord
Peel's secretary. He was acquitted at trial on the grounds
of insanity. A number of questions about this defense were
propounded to the Lord Justices. After lengthy deliberation
they formulated the now famous M'Naghten rules on the
effect of insanity as a defense in a criminal prosecution.
* . . it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing
of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong.5 6
The Lord Justices further held that a person, otherwise
sane, who committed a crime under an insane delusion, not
running to the nature and quality of the act, was responsible
for having committed the act if it were established at trial
that he knew what he was doing was wrong. Such a person
is to be judged at trial as if the facts were as he believed
them to be.
The overwhelming number of Anglo-American jurisdic-
tions have accepted this right and wrong test. "Wrong" has
been interpreted in a moral sense rather than in a legal one
so that, for example, an insane belief on the part of the ac-
cused that the criminal act was ordered by God would con-
stitute a defense. 57
Although English psychiatrists find these rules quite
workable,58 many American writers have criticized them.
First, it is urged that the rules are formulated in terms which
are unintelligible to students of the human mind. "When
they ask me whether the defendant in the dock is in my
opinion insane, I must candidly state... first, that I do not
understand the question, and second, since I don't under-
stand the question I do not know whether the defendant is
5 6M'Naghten's Case, 10 C. & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H. L.
1843).
57 See People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 329-340, 110 N. E. 945, 946-950(1915).58 -LL, PasNciPLEs OF CRimiNAL LAW 477 (1947).
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insane or not." 59 But the question of insanity must be
recognized as a legal one running to responsibility, and not
as a psychiatric one. The purpose of the rule is to determine
which offenders, including those mentally disordered, are to
be subjected to punitive treatment for the purpose of deter-
ring potential offenders and not to determine which ones
should have medical or psychiatric treatment for their in-
dividual rehabilitation. The latter form of treatment is
independently available and is compulsory in most juris-
dictions, whether the defendant is adjudged sane and respon-
sible or irresponsibly insane. Moreover, since a jury of
laymen must determine this matter as an issue of fact, the
simple terms "knowledge", "nature" and "quality" must be
used as symbols which are perhaps more understandable to
the jury than the specialized jargon of the psychiatrist.
Certainly little could be accomplished by borrowing from
the vocabulary of psychoanalysis and have the trial judge
instruct the jury on the defendant's criminal liability in
terms of Freudian "reality-principle", the id, ego and super-
ego.
A second objection which has been made to the
M'Naghten rules is concededly valid, viz., that their formu-
lation ignores the unity of the human mind. The M'Nagh-
ten, rules consider only impairment of the cognitive and
rational processes. It is erroneously assumed that these
processes are unaffected by disorders of volition and emo-
tion. But enlightened trial judges have overcome a construc-
tion of the test which might be misleading and have properly
caused it to function as a rule of responsibility. Those per-
sons incapable of being deterred by the threat of punishment,
and who are suffering from well-defined mental disorders,
are not responsible and the test is not limited to a disorder
of "reason". Those persons who were capable of being de-
terred at the time of commission of the crime are deemed
sane and responsible, although they may or may not have
been afflicted with some sort of mental disorder 0  Rarely
59 ZIBOORG, MIND, MEDICINE AND MAN 274 (1943).
60 See Ludwig, Rationale of Responsibility for Young Offenders, 29 NEB.
L. REv. 521, 537-8 (1950).
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where there is general psychiatric agreement on the existence
of a psychotic mental disorder in a person will the person be
found to be legally responsible.
The most serious complaint of the psychiatrists about
the M'Naghten test, so far as sex offenders are concerned,
is that the test fails to take into consideration the number
of sex offenders who are unable to control their behavior.
"... any number of the obviously and unquestionably men-
tally ill and insane have a keen perception of right and
wrong; in fact, frequently a perception more keen and more
puritanical than that of the average run of normal people." 61
Distinction between right and wrong "is not an important
factor in deciding a question of mental illness." 62 The
theory that some individuals lack a conscience but are other-
wise unimpaired in their mental processes, stems from the
compartmentalized psychology of the early nineteenth cen-
tury with its emphasis on the concepts of "moral sanity,"
"amorality" and the belief in the existence of "moral im-
beciles." 63 The birth of the doctrine of the "irresistible im-
pulse" came with Maudsley's thesis on "impulsive insanity.264
Its recrudescence in the twentieth century is due principally
to the modern popularity of Freudian psychoanalysis in
America. Much human behavior was now explained in terms
of drives originating in the subconscious which are postu-
lated as being completely outside of the advertent control of
will or intellect. These modern theories, of course, parallel
the doctrine of psychological determinism with the rejection
of the freedom of the individual's will.
Some oblique judicial support for this doctrine came
from Stephen who stated that he believed that there were
cases of madness which interfered with the power of self-
control. But Stephen was also of the opinion that a man
who could not control himself also did not know his act was
61MCCArHY & MAEDER, INSANITY AND THE LAW (1928); 136 THE
ANNALS 131, quoted by HALL, op. cit. supra note 58, at 497.
62WHrrF, INSANITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 502, n. 8 (1923).
6 3PDITCHARD, A TREATISE ON INSANITY (1835); RAY, A TREATISE ON
THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY (1838). See also ZILBOORG AND
HENRY, A HISTORY OF MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY 240 ff. (1941).
4 RESPONSIILITY IN MENTAL DISEASE 133 ff. (1874).
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wrong. 5 Although it has been claimed that seventeen states
today have adopted the test of "irresistible impulse," 66 a
careful examination of the cases makes this claim an ex-
tremely doubtful one. 67
A growing number of psychiatrists have rejected the no-
tion that moral knowledge is without significance in mental
illness. "The moral attitude is a real factor in life with
which the psychiatrist must reckon if he is not to commit the
gravest errors." 68 Moreover, sharp dissent from psycho-
analytic theory is frequently voiced: "no critically minded
person . . . can accept psychoanalysis on the basis of the
writings of Freud or of any of his followers." 69 And the
doctrine of "moral insanity" has been explored with no dis-
coveries. The distinguished head of the Boston Children's
Clinic observes: "We have been constantly on the lookout
for a moral imbecile, that is, a person not subnormal and
otherwise intact in mental powers, who shows himself devoid
of moral feeling. We have not found one." 70
The principal deficiency in the "irresistible impulse"
doctrine is the same one which its supporters themselves are
quick to point out in the "right and wrong" test, namely,
that it ignores the unity of the human personality. Is mental
illness possible which affects the individual's power of self-
control without at the same time impairing his power of
cognition? Most modern clinical evidence answers this ques-
tion in the negative. Most psychiatrists agree in rejecting
the theory.7 1 Intelligence and mental tests of psychotics
have demonstrated the related impairment of their rational
65 2 STEPHEN, HISroRY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 169-172 (1883).
66 WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DFxENsE IN CRiMINAL LAW 16, n. 6 (1933).
67 See HAL, Op. cit. supra note 58, at 510.6 8 KAHN, PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITIES 65 (1931). And see HoPNEY, NEW
WAYS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 297 (1939); JUNG, ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY 242(1922) ; RANK, BEYOND PSYCHOLOGY 278 (1941) ; Schroeder, Attitude of One
Amoral Psychologist, 31 PSYCHOANALYTICAL REV. 329-333 (1944).6 9 Murray, Psychology zd the University, 34 A ~cH. NEUROL. & PSYCHIATRY
803, 809 (1935). See also HoRNEY, op. cit. 'pra note 68, at 8; Ds~r,
PSYCHOANALYICAL METHOD AND THE DOCTRINE OF FREUD 294, 301 (1941).7 HEALY, INDIVIUAL DELINQUE T 783 (1927).
7 N See Waite, IrresistiNle Impulse ad Criinl Liability, 23 MICH. L. REv.
443 (1925); Whitman, Capital Punishment and Irreistble Iinpnlse as a De-fene, 5 NoTEE DAM LAw. 188 (1930).
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functions.7 2  The classic prototype of the "irresistible im-
pulse," kleptomania, has been shown in recent investigations
to be a disorder more widespread in its mental implications
than has heretofore been supposed. 3 Moreover the problem
of legal proof presented by any common adoption of the
"irresistible impulse" test is virtually insurmountable. How
can one distinguish an unresisted impulse from an irre-
sistible one? 74 Or how can one properly say that lack of
self-control is due to some "compulsion neurosis" rather than
to a simple indiscipline of the will, often a concomitant of
mental illness?
Thus the same sex offender who cannot be deterred by
the threat of punishment will also be the one who cannot
distinguish right from wrong or who can not understand the
nature and quality of his behavior. If so, he clearly belongs
to a class which is made irresponsible by the M'Naghten
rules. On the other hand, if he is cognitively capable of ap-
praising the moral quality of his act, he is deterrable and
there is no substantial reason why he should not be held
legally sane and responsible.
3. Treatment of All Criminals as Patients
Even if sex offenders cannot be shown to belong to a
special class, distinct from other offenders and for which
traditional rules of responsibility fail to take account, it is
still argued that they, like all criminals, should receive
treatment solely for the sake of individual rehabilitation and
the protection of society from dangerous persons. A criminal
law system which employs punishment is "vengeance under
a disguise, namely the disguise of deterrence." 75 "The time
72 STODDARD, MEANING OF INTELLIGENCE 26 (1943); Bolles & Goldstein,
Impairment of Abstract Behavior in Schizophrenic Patients, 12 PSYCHIAT. Q.
65 (1938); Vigotsky, Thought in Schizophrenia, 31 ARCH. NEUROL. & PSY-
CHIATRY 1063 (1934).
73 Gutheil, Criminal Complex in Comnpulsion Neurosis, 3 J. Cuas. PsYcHo-
PATH. 253 (1941) ; Lurand, Compulsive Stealing, 1 3. Cram. PSYCHOPATH. 247
(1940).
74 See SMITH, PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL 179 (1933). "It is impos-
sible to say, in any particular case, that an impulse was irresistible; all that
can be said is that the impulse did not appear to have been successfully
resisted."7 5 WHITE, INsAITY AND THE CURMmAL LAW 502 (1923).
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will come when stealing or murder will be thought of as a
symptom, indicating the presence of a disease... .)) 76 "The
determinist can make no distinction between the killing of a
human being through criminal violence or through the toxins
of a tubercle baccillus." 77 The adoption of such a non-
punitive system makes irrelevant not only a will free to
select or reject good or evil, but also the entire framework
of responsibility in criminal law. The crucial question is
whether such a system considered as a means is better
adapted than a punitive one for the attainment of the end
of preventing sex crimes.
The adoption of completely indeterminate sentences
means, of course, the abandonment of legislative gradations
of punishment set up according to the seriousness of be-
havior. In its place, treatment is based exclusively on the
offender's need for rehabilitation. This may have disastrous
consequences in some situations when it operates to deprive
a sex offender committing one crime of a powerful incentive
not to undertake another and more serious one. For example,
so long as forcible rape is punished more severely than in-
decent assault, the perpetrator of the latter crime may stop
short of committing the former one when the victim repulses
his advances. But if treatment after conviction is made to
depend solely on what the offender needs for his reformation
rather than upon the seriousness of his behavior, clearly no
motive is supplied by the criminal law to battle down the
defendant's urge to consummate the act of intercourse.7 8
Such indeterminate treatment completely unrelated to
the harmfulness of the crime committed may also deprive
the criminal law of its efficacy as an instrument of education.
Suppose an offensive touching and an act of sodomy are both
classified as sex offenses subjecting the defendant to inde-
terminate sentences from one day to the duration of his
natural life. The criminal may well come to regard the
trivial and serious offense in the same light. On the other
hand, when the legislature prescribes severe treatment for
76 MENNINGOR, HUMAN MiND 373 (1945).
77Brill Determinism in Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis, 95 AM. J. Psy-
CHiATRY 597, 609 (1938).
783 BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGiSLATION, C. 2 (Ogden ed. 1931).
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one crime and lenient treatment for the other, there cannot
be any question about the relative harmfulness of the two
kinds of behavior.7 9
When the sex crime arouses widespread public alarm,
as most of them do, it may not be possible to make available
to the defendant non-punitive treatment even though his per-
sonal needs indicate that he might respond most readily to
it. The writer recalls two defendants who perpetrated an
act of sodomy on a five-year old girl. The grand jury refused
to indict on the unsupported testimony of the child. The
girl's father, who was a longshoreman and former heavy-
weight boxer, threatened to kill them both if he ever got his
hands on them. When one of them returned to the neighbor-
hood six months later, he was found dead on the sidewalk
with a fractured jaw, two blocks from the longshoreman's
home. Frequently the community, justifiably or not, insists
on punitive treatment. Failure to heed this cry may lead to
self-help, vigilantism, lynching or what may be worse, a gen-
eral indifference to the criminal law.8 0 It is true that ap-
peasement of such public demand may make the criminal law
an instrument of private vengeance."' Prudence in charting
a course consistent with the prevention of crime will often
require punitive treatment in such cases.
Finally, because treatment aimed solely at rehabilitation
is compulsory and necessitates restraint for some indefinite
period, the fiction that it is non-punitive becomes quite trans-
parent. Under current indeterminate sentences life impris-
onment for certain sex felonies is possible when the defen-
dant proves incorrigible, or at least is too inexperienced to
7 9 BECCARIA, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, C. 1iii.
s0 See HOLMES, THE CommoN LAw 41-42 (1881): "The first requirement
of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual feelings
and demands of the community, whether right or wrong. If people would
gratify the passion of revenge outside of the law, if the law did not help
them, the law has no choice but to satisfy the craving itself, and thus avoid
the greater evil of private retribution. At the same time, this passion is not
one which we encourage, either as private individuals or as lawmakers."
sB See WHrIT, INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 13-14 (1923): "The
criminal thus becomes the handy scapegoat upon which [the average man] can
transfer his feeling of his own tendency to sinfulness and thus by punishing
the criminal he deludes himself into a feeling of righteous indignation, thus
bolstering up his own self-respect and serving in this roundabout way, both
to restrain himself from like indulgences and to keep himself upon the path
of cultural progress!'
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simulate the approved response which brings early parole.,
This raises a serious political question of civil liberty. In
addition, when more harmful behavior is treated less severely
than trivial criminal behavior the inequality of such treat-
ment suggests that it is unjust.
On the other hand, it is not correct to characterize a
system which employs punishment as retributive or one
which serves the end of vengeance only. Retribution as a
sole end of criminal law has indeed been urged by Kant,
Hegel and Kohler.82 It is not, however, the view of those
who would use punishment as a means to the end of prevent-
ing crime. Aristotle 83 and St. Thomas Aquinas 11 first
stated this position which was later less perfectly adopted by
the utilitarians, Bentham 85 and Von Jhering.' Moreover,
the use of punishment to influence human behavior is based
on sound psychology. Men seek pleasure, avoid pain. Pun-
ishing an actual offender prevents crime by the threat it
makes to the potential one. Normally, certainty of punish-
ment is more effective than its severity in influencing be-
havior. Assuming a given probability of its infliction, effec-
tiveness of punitive treatment varies in direct proportion to
its severity. This is certainly not the same as saying that
punishment serves the end of retribution.87
One frequent criticism of the punitive system is certainly
without justification: viz., that it necessarily contemplates
a system based on revenge. The retributionists themselves
refute this: "Juridical punishment can never be administered
merely as a means for promoting another good, whether with
regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must
in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom
it is inflicted has committed a crime." 88
There is hardly more validity in the argument that the
deterrent effect of punishment on potential offenders is in-
82 KANT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 ff.; HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
90 ff. (Dyde ed. 1896); KOHLER, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 279 ff. (1914).
83 ETHics, V. 1.
84 ".. . laws are enacted for no private profit, but for the common benefit
of the citizens." DE SUMMA THEOLOGIA Ia, Hae, Q. 90, Art. 2.
85 PRINCIPLES OF LEoisLAnoN, c. i.
88 LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END.
87 See Ludwig, supra note 60, at 536.
8 8
KANT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195.
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appreciable or non-existent. The fact that crime continues
in spite of threats by the criminal law is far from conclusive.
No jurisdiction has yet been willing to risk the experiment
of determining whether the crime rate would be greater
without them. But however efficacious as a deterrent to
potential offenders, punishment is therapeutically ill-adapted
for rehabilitation of actual ones. Experiments in animal
and educational psychology have produced conflicting data
on its constructive effects.89 They confirm common experi-
ence that rewards supply superior motivation for human
behavior. They also support the view that the efficacy of
properly administered punishment is directly proportional to
the subject's immaturity." But their application to the
criminal law system is extremely conjectural. Threats of
electric shock to the maze rat or of teacher to pupil are not
the same as legal ones to a young offender. Punitive treat-
ment, especially when severe in the penal situation, brutalizes
and embitters more often than it reforms."1
CONCLUSION
No radical alteration in the sex behavior content of
penal statutes is necessitated by investigations purporting to
demonstrate widespread disregard of traditional norms. The
penal law must not abdicate as an instrument of moral
education.
As for treatment of sex offenders, it may most truthfully
be stated that causes have yet to be isolated. Until this is
done, no final "cures" are even reasonably certain. The
symptoms of such behavior are quite complicated. And the
more that is written about them, the more complicated the
89 Strang, Contributions of Research to Disciplije and Control, 237rH YEAR-
BOOK, NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR STUDY OF EDUCATION 216 ff. (1938) (88 studies
reviewed).
902 SEARS, RssPoNsimnITY 129-154 (1932) (12 case histories).
91 See R USCHE AND KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND THE SOCIAL STRUC-
TURE 138 ff. (1939); see SCHOPENHAUEM, WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA 412(1886): "The Penitentiary system seeks not so much to punish the deed as
the man, in order to reform him. It therefore sets aside the real aim of
punishment, determent from the deed, in order to attain the very problematic
end of reformation. But it is always a doubtful thing to attempt to attain
two different ends by one means; how much more so if the two are in any
sense opposite ends."
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entire problem gets. Psychiatry is a relatively recent de-
velopment in man's efforts to better understand himself. In
proportion, as greater insight is worked out in this disci-
pline, much more can be expected from this approach to
treatment. For the present, psychiatrists do not claim that
they know all the answers. Nor is the criminal law-despite
its centuries of experience-in a position to make such a
claim.
In the light of these facts, the proper approach to the
problem of treating sex offenders at best can be no more than
one of tentative experiment. Clearly no greater failure can
be imagined than a program steered by the light of a single
theory. It is equally absurd to claim that sex offenders
must be subjected solely to non-punitive treatment for the
sake of rehabilitating them and protecting society as it is to
claim that their treatment must always be punitive so that
others will be deterred. No scientific basis has yet been
established for separating corrigible from incorrigible sex
offenders or for determining when it is safe to assume that
the corrigible ones have been reformed.
The control of sex offenders then remains a practical
problem and at present can be handled only by practical
methods. First, if a sex offender is sent to jail, he will not
harm society with sex offenses while he is there. Second, if
he is sent to jail, others who would be sex offenders are likely
to change their minds. This is the extent of the contribution
of the criminal law to the solution of the problem.
If while he is in jail, he can be helped better to under-
stand himself, when he returns to society he will be in a
superior position to avoid repeating his mistakes. This re-
mains the job for psychiatry.
Since there is no significant difference between sex
offenders and offenders committing non-sexual crimes, the re-
cent New York statute providing special treatment for sex
offenders is without theoretical experimental basis. The un-
favorable experience of other states with similar statutes
does not justify undertaking such legislation as a tentative
experiment in treating sex criminals. Moreover, adoption of
such a statute as a first step towards legislation making such
treatment mandatory for sex or all offenders, would be set-
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ting sail in a sea of doubt, as we have noted. If under the
present statute, judges exercise their discretion extensively
to sentence sex offenders indeterminately and the parole
board is unduly lenient or severe in releasing such offenders,
then the end of preventing sex crimes would be seriously dis-
served by its retention. Its repeal therefore would result in
no loss and might obviate many dangers in criminal law
administration.
